Proposed Changes in Minnesota Mortgage Law by Editorial Board, Minn. L. Rev.
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review
1965
Proposed Changes in Minnesota Mortgage Law
Minn. L. Rev. Editorial Board
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Editorial Board, Minn. L. Rev., "Proposed Changes in Minnesota Mortgage Law" (1965). Minnesota Law Review. 2849.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/2849
Notes
Proposed Changes in Minnesota Mortgage Law
Minnesota presently provides for a one year statutory
redemption period after a mortgage foreclosure sale. A
number of states have recently shortened their postsale
redemption periods and it has been advocated that Min-
nesota do the same. Also, Minnesota is one of three
states which does not enforce an assignment of rents
clause, effective at default, when executed contempo-
raneously with the mortgage instrument. The author of
this Note, in considering the need for change in these
two aspects of Minnesota mortgage law, examines the
basis and policy of the present laws and the effect of the
proposed reforms on mortgage lending and the parties
involved. He concludes that public policy would be served
without substantially prejudicing mortgage debtors if
the length of the statutory redemption period were sub-
stantially reduced, and that the enforcement of an
assignment of rents clause executed contemporaneously
with the mortgage instrument is necessary to give the
mortgagee adequate security for loans secured by income-
producing property.
INTRODUCTION
Many jurisdictions have statutes providing for a lengthy
period following foreclosure sales during which a defaulting mort-
gagor may redeem his mortgaged property. These statutes are
designed to afford the mortgagor an adequate opportunity to pro-
tect his interest in the property. As will be shown, however, they
have served largely to expose mortgage lenders to expense and
frustration. Consequently, a number of jurisdictions have recently
amended their statutes to shorten the redemption period.' Similar
1. See generally 2 GrsxL , MORTGAGES §§ 297-43 (1943); OSBORNE,
MORTGAGES § 307-10 (1951) [hereinafter cited as OSBorne].
2. Illinois has shortened its redemption period from 15 months following
the time of sale to 12 months from the time of service or six months from the
time of sale, whichever is later. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 77, § 18e (1963); see
Bernard, Legal Aspects of 1961 Mortgage and Redemption Law Legislation
in Illinoi3s, 43 CHICAGO B. REcoun 229 (1962).
Indiana formerly postponed the foreclosure sale for one year following the
filing of the complaint in the foreclosure proceedings. This period has been
reduced to six months. INr. ANN. STAT. § 3-1801 (Supp. 1964).
A 1961 amendment to the Iowa statute permits the parties to agree in the
mortgage instrument to a six month postsale redemption period in place of
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reduction of Minnesota's one year period3 has recently been
proposed.
Minnesota also currently prohibits the inclusion in a mortgage
instrument of any provision under which all of the rents and
profits arising from the mortgaged property after default are as-
signed to the mortgagee. In this respect, Minnesota differs from
other "lien" theory states, the majority of which permit such
provisions to enable mortgagees to protect their security between
default and foreclosure sale by applying all rents and profits re-
ceived during this period to the mortgage debt. It is arguable that
the Minnesota rule is founded on public policy considerations of
dubious validity and that it imposes an unjustifiable risk upon
a mortgagee's security interest.
The purpose of this Note is to discuss and consider proposed
the normal one year period if the mortgagee waives his right to a deficiency
judgment and the mortgaged property is less than 10 acres in area. IowA
CODE § 628.26 (1962).
In 1963, Maine's one year redemption period was shortened to six months.
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 177, §§ 4-A, 7-A (Supp. 1963).
Michigan substantially modified its one year postsale redemption period by
a 1964 amendment. The period is now six months for mortgages on commercial
and industrial property, multiple dwellings of more than four units, and
residential dwellings located on less than three acres of land where the balance
due on the mortgage debt is more than % of the original loan. Mcn. STAT.
ANN. § 27A.3240 (Supp. 1964).
Nebraska provides for redemption before sale by staying the order of sale
for nine months if the mortgagor requests. This period has been reduced to
six months for mortgages with more than 10 years to run on subdivision
property or residential property of less then three acres in area, and to three
months for similar property where the mortgage will not mature for 20 years
or more. NEB. Rnv. STAT. § 25-1506 (Supp. 1963).
The South Dakota statute, which normally provides for a one year post-
sale redemption period, was amended in 1963 to allow the parties to agree
to a period of 180 days if the property is less than three acres in area S. D.
Sess. Laws 1963, ch. 236.
In Washington the postsale period has been reduced to eight months as
opposed to 12 if the mortgagee waives his right to a deficiency judgment and
the mortgage instrument states that the property is not used for agricultural
or farming purposes. WAsH. REv. ConE § 6.24.140 (Supp. 1963).
Wisconsin amended its provision which postponed sale for one year fol-
lowing a judgment of foreclosure, shortening the period to six months if, (1)
the mortgagee elects in his complaint to waive a deficiency judgment and
permit the mortgagor to remain in possession during the period, (2) the mort-
gage instrument allowed such an election, and (3) the mortgaged real estate is
less than three acres in area. Wis. STAT. § 278.101 (1963).
3. Mm. STAT. § 580.23 (1961) provides for a 12 month redemption period
following sale under foreclosure by advertisement, and § 581.10 provides for a
one year period from the order confirming sale under foreclosure by action.
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changes in these two aspects of Iinnesota mortgage law in the
light of legal theory, practical considerations, and public policy.
I. THE STATUTORY REDEMPTION PERIOD
At common law a mortgage instrument took the form of a
conveyance subject to condition subsequent -payment of the
mortgage debt. Upon the mortgagor's default, his property inter-
est was automatically forfeited and title in the mortgagee be-
came absolute. The courts of equity tempered the harshness of
this rule by creating an "equity of redemption" by virtue of
which absolute vesting of the mortgagee's title was postponed
for some time following default to afford the mortgagor an oppor-
tunity to "redeem." 4 This equitable right to redeem could be
extinguished by foreclosure proceedings.5 In addition to the equity
of redemption, however, half of the states have enacted statutes
providing for a further redemption privilege exercisable after the
foreclosure sale.6 These statutes permit the defaulting mortgagor,
4. OSBORNE § 6. It is unclear whether equity intervened to prevent a
forfeiture on the ground that the conveyance of the land was intended only
to afford the mortgagee security, or to expand the scope of its jurisdiction at
the expense of the law courts. At first equity permitted redemption after de-
fault only in special cases, but later it became a matter of right. Ibid.
5. Formerly, under a theory of "strict foreclosure," the mortgagee obtained
a court order that his title would indefeasibly vest unless the mortgagor exer-
cised his "equity of redemption" within a stipulated period. However, strict
foreclosure has been replaced by other methods involving public sale of the
land. See OsBorN § 10. It was thought that by introducing a sale the full
value of the property would be liquidated at foreclosure so that any value
in excess of the amount of the debt could be retained by the mortgagor. How-
ever, this hope has not always been realized because public sales have not
drawn bidders. See Prather, Foreclosure of the Security Interest, 1957 U. IIm.
L.F. 420, 445. For a general discussion of foreclosure in the United States, see
Tefft, The Myth of Strict Foreclosure, 4 U. CHI. L. REv. 575, 588-91 (1937).
In linnesota the mortgagee may foreclose by judicial action, MINN. STAT.
§§ 581.01-.12 (1961), or by exercising a power of sale contained in the mort-
gage instrument, MIN. STAT. § 580.01-.30 (1961). These methods are com-
mon in most states. For a summary of methods of foreclosure and other
mortgage provisions of each state, see Sherman, MORTGAGE RF-, ESTATE
INVESTM ENT GUI 1-185 (Nov. 1964 ed.). For a map illustrating the usual
methods of foreclosure in each state, see Bridewell, The Effects of Defective
Mortgage Laws on Home Financing, 5 LAW & CONTED . PROB. 545, 547
(1938).
6. Twenty-five states do not provide for redemption after sale; eight states
provide for a period of six months or less; 15 states provide for a one year
period; two states have a two year period. See Sherman, op. cit. supra note 5,
at 1-185 (para. 8 of each state unit).
Indiana, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Wisconsin provide for a statutory
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during the redemption period, (1) to redeem his property by
tendering to the purchaser the amount of the sale price plus
interest and costs7 and (9) to retain possession of the property.'
Presumably the enactment of the redemption statutes reflects
a feeling that the equitable right of redemption was inadequate
to protect the mortgagor. Legislatures apparently sought pri-
marily to avert ultimate loss of possession by providing the mort-
gagor more time to refinance his indebtedness or otherwise to re-
deem his property.9 It was also thought that the availability of the
additional period would induce higher bidding at foreclosure sales
since the mortgagor or one of his creditors would probably redeem
if the sale price did not fairly reflect the market value of the
property.10
period of redemption following the entry of judgment in the foreclosure action
during which the order of sale cannot be issued. See IN. Ai N. STAT. § 3-1801
(Supp. 1964); NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-1506 (Supp. 1963); OKLA. STAT. tit. 46, § 4
(1961); Wis. STAT. §§ 278.10, .101 (1963). Such statutes delay recovery by
lenders of their investments just as do those which create a redemption
period after the sale. But bidders are undoubtedly more attracted by a fore-
closure sale which is not followed by a lengthy redemption period.
7. The mortgagor's creditors may also redeem, both from a foreclosure by
action, fnrr. STAT. § 581.10 (1961), and from a foreclosure by exercise of the
power of sale contained in a mortgage instrument, mmqw. STAT. § 580.24
(1961). If the purchaser at the foreclosure sale pays taxes or assessments to
prevent penalty, or any insurance premiums or installments on superior
mortgages, the sum paid will be added to the amount otherwise required for
redemption. M wI. STAT. § 582.03 (1961).
8. Eight of the 25 states which provide for a statutory redemption period
after sale grant the purchaser the right to possession during the period. See
Sherman, op. cit. supra note 5, at 1-185 (para. 8 of each state unit). In
Idaho and Nevada the purchaser has a right to rents though the debtor has
the right to possession. The amount required to redeem is reduced by the
amount of the rents collected. IDAHo CODE ANN. § 11-407 (1948); NEv. 11Ev.
STAT. § 21.250 (1963).
9. "These early redemption statutes came as a result of depression periods,
and may be associated with the general collapse of land values, the failure
of governmental public land policy, and governmental relief and moratory
measures in connection with the sale of public land." SKILTON, GOVERNMENT
AND TH MORTGAGE DEBTOR 20 (1944).
10. In Durfee & Doddridge, Redemption From Foreclosure Sale- The
Uniform Mortgage Act, 23 Mrcn. L. REv. 825, 838-41 (1925), the authors
conclude that the only justifiable rationale for the redemption statutes lies in
whatever stimulus they may afford to active bidding since a long postsale
period would not be necessary merely to secure refinancing. This could be
accomplished by a statute requiring a lapse of time between filing or notice
and the sale. See also Ky. REv. STAT. § 426.220 (1962), which provides for a
postsale redemption period only if the property is sold for less than % of its
appraised value.
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However, experience has revealed that neither objective has
been attained. As for the first, debtors who are incapable of avert-
ing foreclosure by refinancing during the equitable redemption
period usually have not found it feasible to refinance after fore-
closure.n If the mortgagor has accumulated considerable equity
in the property, he will usually be able to avoid foreclosure by
refinancing in the first place; the mortgagor with little equity
either has little incentive to refinance or will find it difficult to
do so. With respect to the second objective, the existence of a
redemption period has not encouraged higher bidding because
few people appear at foreclosure sales and, as noted above, re-
demption during this period is rare. In fact, the delay in vesting
of title incident to the statutory redemption period has actually
discouraged prospective purchasers from participating in fore-
closure sales.12
It appears that, rather than assisting the economically de-
prived, the statutory period merely facilitates abuse by the
slovenly and indiscreet. An unpublished study of the reasons
11. Comment, 28 WAsH. L. REv. 39, 42-43 (1953), argues that the redemp-
tion period should be abolished because few mortgages are foreclosed, redemp-
tion is infrequent when they are, and refinancing is usually available prior to
foreclosure if at all.
In addition to the availability of refinancing prior to foreclosure, it may
be easier to meet the mortgage obligation before rather than after foreclosure.
MMN. STAT. 1 580.30 (1961), provides that:
In any proceedings for the foreclosure of a real estate mortgage,
whether by action or by advertisement, if at any time before the sale
of the premises under such foreclosure the mortgagor, the owner, or
any holder of any subsequent encumbrance or lien, or any one for
them, shall pay.., the amount actually due thereon and constituting
the default actually existing in the conditions of the mortgage at the
time of the commencement of the foreclosure proceedings, including
insurance, delinquent taxes, if any, upon the premises, interest to date
of payment,... the mortgage shall be fully reinstated ....
A parallel provision applying to foreclosure by action may be found at §
581.07. These provisions have been construed to permit reinstatement of the
mortgage upon payment only of the payments of principal and interest in
default, notwithstanding the presence in the mortgage instrument of an "ac-
celeration clause" making the entire debt due upon default. See First Nat'l
Bank v. Schunk, 201 Minn. 359, 362, 276 N.W. 290, 292 (1938) (dictum).
12.
Redemption from sale is not without its undesirable results.... And
it certainly caps the wall we have built to keep the public away from
the public sale. The best market for land is found among those who
desire it for immediate use, and to them, obviously, the redemption
feature is prohibitive.... Substantially, redemption statutes limit the
sale to those who already have a stake in the land.
Durfee & Doddridge, supra note 10, at 841 n.51.
1965]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:331
underlying foreclosure of Minnesota VA and FHU mortgages
between 1961 and 1964 reveals that about 75 percent of them
arose from "non-economic" causes - improper regard for the
mortgage obligation, bad faith, financial carelessness, or marital
difficulties.'"
Not only do lengthy redemption periods fail to protect needy
mortgagors, but they have proven to be particularly burdensome
to mortgage lenders. 14 Lenders normally tolerate delinquency for
several months before foreclosing.' 5 Once commenced, foreclosure
procedures take another month or two.'8 Since the purchaser at
the foreclosure sale is almost invariably the mortgagee and re-
demption rarely occurs, the effect of the one year redemption
period in most cases is the further deferral of realization by the
mortgagee of his security. The total length of time from the
mortgagor's default to the end of the redemption period often
exceeds 18 months. During this period the mortgagee is exposed
to the risk that falling real estate prices, normal depreciation, or
the mortgagor's neglect will substantially diminish the value of his
security. He is also deprived of interest on his investment for this
period unless the mortgagor or another eligible party redeems.
Moreover, since defaulting mortgagors usually fail to pay taxes
and assessments levied upon the property, these obligations must
be discharged before resale.' 7 Insofar as it may be presumed that
13. The study classified these as noneconomic reasons since the debtor in
each instance could have discharged his obligation if he possessed a proper
motivation and/or a modicum of financial foresight. The remaining 25% of
the foreclosures resulted, according to the study, for "economic" reasons - the
mortgagor either lost his job or illness prevented him from earning enough
income to pay his debt.
A recent study of single-family conventional mortgage foreclosures by sav-
ings and loan associations concluded that improper regard for the mortgage
obligation accounted for 34% of the foreclosures during the period in ques-
tion, excessive installment obligations caused another 19%, and marital diffi-
culty produced 5%. KENDALL, ANATOmY OF TEM RESMENTIAL MORTGAGE 78
(1964).
14. The mortgage lending market is dominated by institutional lenders.
As of 1960, life insurance companies had 42 billion dollars invested in mort-
gages, savings and loan associations held 60 billion dollars worth, and mutual
saving banks and commercial banks held 55 billion dollars in mortgages.
BRYANT, MORTGAGE LENDING 73 (2d ed. 1962).
15. Lenders often attempt a "forebearance" plan by which it is agreed
that the mortgagor need pay only interest for a certain period, with payments
on principal to be resumed thereafter. Wall Street J., Feb. 11, 1965, p. 7, col. 1.
16. HwN. STAT. § 580.03 (1961) requires six weeks published notice and
service of a copy of the notice on the person in possession four weeks before
sale.
17. If redemption occurs the redeemer must reimburse the buyer for taxes,
assessments, and insurance outlays. MINN. STAT. § 582.03 (1961).
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mortgagees' expenses and risks have a direct impact on the terms
of mortgage financing, prospective mortgagors may be expected
to bear the ultimate burden imposed by long redemption periods
in the form of inflated interest rates or margin requirements.
Some period of redemption after sale seems both necessary and
desirable. Due to the absence of competitive bidding" and the
fact that mortgagees seldom bid more than the amount of the
outstanding debt,19 the foreclosure sale, like any other forced sale,
is a poor device for realizing the full market value of property.
A subsequent period of redemption will afford the mortgagor an
opportunity to recoup his equity even if the sale price is appreci-
ably below market value, since he can market his statutory right
to redeem and is entitled to any amount in excess of the mortgage
debt paid by anyone else who does redeem. Moreover, at least a
short period ought to be available for redemption after sale to
afford mortgagors a final opportunity to avoid being dispossessed
of their property. The preforeclosure period may in some cases
be inadequate for a mortgagor completely to exhaust available
credit sources, particularly if he has been sick or out of work or
has otherwise experienced a temporary crisis. Finally, the exist-
ence of some postsale foreclosure period will probably deter mort-
gagees from foreclosing too hastily.
However, all these objectives could be obtained through the
use of a period substantially shorter than 12 months. And a
shorter period would reduce the burdens upon mortgagees - ulti-
mately borne by the borrowing public- incident to postsale
redemption periods. While the highly competitive nature of the
mortgage market may distort the impact of such a change, it is
likely that a reduction of costs would produce, (1) an increase in
loan-value ratios, (2) a reduction in mortgage interest rates, and/
or (3) an increase in return to the mortgagees. Thus, Minnesota
could substantially shorten its statutory redemption period with-
out losing its advantages.
The redemption period need not be the same for all kinds of
property. Factors which ought to be considered in determining
the length of the period for each kind of property are: its nature,
the risk that it will diminish in value as a result of the mort-
gagor's active conduct or negligence during the period, the extent
of the mortgagor's equity, and the effectiveness of the mortgagor's
18. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
19. The mortgagee has little incentive to bid more than the debt since
generally his only purpose is to realize the amount of the debt from his
security.
1965]
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preforeclosure opportunities to satisfy his obligations. For ex-
ample, early termination of residential or farm occupancy would
probably be socially less desirable than termination of a com-
mercial or industrial occupancy. The risk of deterioration may be
substantially greater for commercial and residential property than
for farm property; farm land cannot be greatly diminished in
value even in a year's time, while mismanagement or lack of care
of commercial and residential property may destroy its value in a
relatively short period. It would seem that mortgagors with a large
equity should have a relatively longer period to redeem. Farm
mortgagors should have a relatively short period since they often
have personalty available with which to secure a loan to pay off
delinquent installments prior to foreclosure. In contrast, low
equity residential mortgagors may own little unencumbered per-
sonal property and consequently require a longer period to raise
the necessary funds. On the other hand, farm mortgages usually
secure substantially larger debts than residential mortgages,20 so
that a farm mortgagor may need a longer period in which to re-
finance than does his urban counterpart. 2'
20. For an exhaustive discussion of urban mortgages current to 1953, see
MORTON, UR.A MORTGAGE LNDING (1956).
21. A bill was introduced into the 1965 session of the Minnesota legis-
lature which would have reduced the one year redemption period presently
applicable to all property to (1) four months for industrial, commercial, and
multiple dwelling mortgagors, and (2) six months for residential mortgagors
on less than three acres (including multiple dwellings of four units or less)
where the balance due on the principal of the mortgage exceeds % of the
original mortgage loan. For all remaining property, including farms of five
acres or over and residences where the existing -balance of the mortgage is
% or less of the original amount, the redemption period would remain one
year. Minn. House File No. 1960, 64th Sess. (1965); Minn. Senate File No.
749, 64th Sess. (1965). No action was taken on this proposal.
The proposal is patterned after the Michigan amendment of 1964. The
new Michigan periods, however, are six months and one year, respectively.
See note 2 supra; McH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.3240 (Supp. 1964).
Most farmers would still enjoy a one year period under the Minnesota
proposal. They may have been so favored to permit the gathering of two
harvests to finance a redemption, so that a single crop failure will not produce
a fatal delinquency. State statutes that differentiate usually allow farmers
the longest redemption period. See IowA CODE 1 628.26 (1962); MicH. STAT.
ANN. § 27A.3240 (Supp. 1964); NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-1506 (Supp. 1963); S.D.
Seas. Laws 1963, ch. 236; Wi. STAT. § 278.10 (1963).
Many residential mortgagors would also enjoy a one year period under
the Minnesota proposal. Those who defaulted before liquidating % of the
original loan, however, would have only four months. This distinction based
upon relative outstanding indebtedness may have merit. While it can be
argued that a mortgagor with a large amount to pay should have a longer
338
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II. THE ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS PROIBITION
A small minority of states2 currently follow the "title theory"
of mortgage law, while a majority,22 including Minnesota, adhere
to the "lien theory." Under the title theory the mortgage instru-
ment is deemed a conveyance of legal title to the property to the
mortgagee subject to defeasance on the payment of the debt.
Since the mortgagee rather than the mortgagor holds title while
the debt remains outstanding, the former is entitled to possess
and enjoy the property immediately upon the execution of the
mortgage. Though he usually permits the mortgagor to retain
possession,24 the title mortgagee may at default obtain possession,
collect rents and profits, and apply them to the mortgage debt.25
redemption period instead of a shorter one, it would appear more convincing
to urge that a debtor with little equity is less likely to redeem and according-
ly may have less incentive to maintain the property during the period. See
MrcH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.3240 (Supp. 1964) which provides for a six month
period instead of one year for residential mortgages on property of less than
three acres if the outstanding balance is more than % of the original loan. See
also K AN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3429 (Supp. 1961), restricting the period
to six months rather than the usual 18 months for a purchase money mort-
gage less than % of which has been repaid.
Although commercial and industrial mortgagors would have but a two
month statutory redemption period, the total redemption period would ex-
tend to at least four or five months after default since the foreclosure pro-
cedure alone takes two months.
22. Alabama, Georgia, Maine, Maryland, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island. See OsnomN §§ 13-16; Prather, supra note 5, at 450.
23. Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, Wisconsin, Wyoming.
24. Mortgagees are not anxious to take possession since they would then
be held to the duties of a "mortgagee in possession." See note 43 infra.
25. In title states the mortgagee may obtain possession at any time by
an action at law for ejectment. However, ejectment is very cumbersome. The
action itself may take a period of time. Once in possession the mortgagee has
the obligation to account as a "mortgagee in possession." See note 43 infra.
Further, if the mortgagee takes possession, leases subsequent to the execution
of the mortgage instrument may be terminated at the will of the lessee. For
these reasons the mortgagee in a title state prefers to have a receiver ap-
pointed to collect the rents. However, a court of equity will appoint a re-
ceiver only if the legal remedy of ejectment is inadequate. Therefore, to ob-
tain a receiver the mortgagee must establish that the land alone is inadequate
to secure the debt even though he has a right to possession and with it the
rents and profits. OSBORm § 148. In addition to relieving the mortgagee of
the burden of entering possession and being held to an accounting, the ap-
pointment of a receiver is advantageous since the receiver has the option of
affirming leases made subsequent to the mortgage. Id. § 154.
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These possessory rights afford him protection against waste2 and
milking27 by the mortgagor. In contrast, the "lien" mortgagee is
given substantially fewer rights. 2 The mortgage instrument is not
regarded as conveying him legal title, but only a security interest.
Rights of ownership and possession thus remain in the mortgagor
until foreclosure and expiration of the redemption period, 29 and
the mortgagee is not entitled to rents and profits until that time.
To strengthen their security interest, lien state mortgagees
often bargain for an assignment of rents from the mortgagor.30
26. The Minnesota court has broadly defined waste: "[A] mortgagor is
chargeable with waste ... whenever, through the fault of the mortgagor, the
mortgagee loses some part of the security which he had when he took his
mortgage." Nielsen v. Heald, 151 Minn. 181, 184, 186 N.W. 299, 300 (1922).
The Nielsen court held that failure to pay interest on prior mortgages or
taxes on the property was waste. Ibid. Failure to pay assessments or insur-
ance or to make necessary repairs is also considered waste. Mutual Benefit
Life Ins. Co. v. .Canby Inv. Co., 190 Minn. 144, 146, 251 N.W. 129, 131 (1933).
27. "'Milking' has become a standard term denoting spoilation of the
mortgaged property, rent reduction and lease cancellations by the mortgagor
for a cash consideration, and prepayment of rent -all devices by which the
hard-pressed mortgagor saps the value from the pledged assets." Note, The
Mortgagee's Right to Rents After Default, 50 YAIz LJ. 1424 n.1 (1911).
Execution of leases requiring prepayment of all or a substantial portion of the
rent, and the assignment of future rents to a third person are commonly used
methods for milking mortgaged property. OSBoRNE § 158.
28. For general discussion of the lien theory, see Durfee, The Lien or
Equitable Theory of the Mortgage-Some Generalizations, 10 MicH. L. REv.
587 (1912); Lloyd, Mortgages- The Genesis of the Lien Theory, 32 YALF.
LJ. 233 (1923); Sturges & Clark, Legal Theory and Real Property Mortgages,
37 YALE L.J. 691 (1928).
A third, intermediate theory is similar to the title theory except that the
mortgagee has no right to possession until default. States which adhere to
this view are Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Massachusetts, Mis-
sissippi, Missouri, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Vermont, Virginia, and
West Virginia. Prather, supra note 5, at 450.
29. The essence of the title-lien distinction is the right to possession. See
KP.Tovm, RuAL EsTATE, LAw § 369 (1964).
30. For a discussion of assignment of rents clauses under the three mort-
gage theories, see Kratovil, Mortgages-Problems in Possession, Rents, and
Mortgagee Liability, 11 DE PAuL L. RFv. 1 (1961).
An assignment of rents clause may not be necessary in states which follow
the title or intermediate theory, since the mortgagee in such a state has a
right to possession upon default if not before, notes 25 & 28 supra, and
ordinarily could utilize this right as a lever with which to obtain rents even
without an assignment clause. However, the title mortgagee may wish to ob-
tain an assignment of rents, since the consent of the mortgagor to an assign-
ment may influence the court in determining whether to appoint a receiver to
collect the rents. OsnoaNE § 150, at 370. For a number of reasons the mort-
gagee prefers to have a receiver collect the rents rather than to repossess him-
self. See note 25 supra.
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The assignment may be included in the mortgage, made con-
temporaneously with the mortgage as a separate agreement, or
be consummated subsequent to the mortgage for new considera-
tion.31 In return for the right to whatever rents and profits are
produced by the mortgaged property after the occurrence of a
stipulated condition, usually default,"' a typical assignment con-
tract obligates the mortgagee to apply the proceeds to taxes,
insurance, repairs, assessments, and the mortgage debt, and to
account for their use to the mortgagor.
An assignment of rents may be advantageous to both mort-
gagee and mortgagor. It enhances the mortgagee's security inter-
est by permitting him to reach the rents and profits before he
obtains the property itself. It may make foreclosure unnecessary
and unattractive where rents and profits closely approximate the
mortgage installments. Even if foreclosure should become neces-
sary, rents previously collected may have reduced the outstanding
mortgage indebtedness enough to make a deficiency judgment
unnecessary. The assignment gives the mortgagee a claim to the
rents prior to subsequent creditors of the defaulting mortgagor 3
Finally, an assignment of rents may afford the security of a mort-
gagee greater protection against milldngs than that afforded by
31. The new consideration usually takes the form of some concession to
the mortgagor. See Seifert v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 203 Minn. 415,
417, 281 N.W. 770, 771 (1938) (mortgagee agreed to bid full amount of debt
in case of a sale); Prudential Ius. Co. v. A. Enkema Holding Co., 196 Minn. 154,
264 N.W. 576 (1936) (mortgagee agreed to delay foreclosing for delinquency
in interest payments); Farmers Trust Co. v. Prudden, 84 Minn. 126, 86 N.W.
887 (1901) (extension of time for payment).
32. Although the assignment clause is conditioned to take effect upon a
particular event, it must be activated by the mortgagee at that time. Con-
duct sufficient to activate the assignment varies among the states. A formal
demand for rents with notice to the mortgagor's lessee, the initiation of a
foreclosure suit, and the appointment of a receiver are common methods. The
requirement that the assignment be activated is to protect the mortgagor-
if the assignment were absolute he would be liable for rents collected after
the effective date though the mortgagee had not demanded them. See Note,
50 YALE L.J. 1424, 1428 (1941).
33. Berick, The Mortgagee's Right to Rents, 8 U. Cic. L. REv. 250, 284
n.118 (1934), points out that by ruling assignment clauses invalid, the courts
favor the mortgagor's tenants, creditors, and assigns.
Most debtors who default have other creditors who will attach the rents.
Of course it may be questioned whether the mortgagee should be favored over
general creditors, but it is arguable that he should as to the rents since his
investment is producing them.
34. If the mortgagee notifies the mortgagor's tenant of the assignment the
mortgagee is not thereafter bound by rental reductions or prepayments to
which the mortgagor and tenant agree, even when arranged before the mort-
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appointment of a receiver! 5
In 25 of the 28 lien theory states, an assignment of rents clause
included in the mortgage instrument or executed contempo-
raneously with it is valid and enforceable3 6 However, the Minne-
sota court has reasoned that since the statute establishing the
lien theory provides that a mortgage shall not "be deemed a con-
veyance, so as to enable the owner of the mortgage to recover
gagor's default. See Kratovil, Mortgages -Problems in Possession, Rents, and
Mortgagee Liability, 11 Dm PAuL L. REV. 1, 14 & nn.42-43 (1961). The ap-
pointment of a receiver would bar such agreements only after default.
35. Although the court's power to appoint a receiver to collect the rents
and profits was not abrogated by the lien statute, it is exercised cautiously.
The test was stated in Nielson v. Heald, 151 Minn. 181, 186 N.W. 299 (1922):
The inadequacy of the security and the insolvency of those personally
liable for the debt, are not of themselves sufficient grounds for the ap-
pointment of a receiver, for the rents and profits are no part of the
security .... To obtain the appointment of a receiver, the mortgagee
must show not only that the security is inadequate and the debtor in-
solvent, but also that his security is becoming impaired through the
wrongful failure of the mortgagor ...to protect the property from
waste.
Id. at 185, 186 N.W. at 301. (Emphasis added.)
The criteria of insolvency, inadequacy of security, and failure to protect
from waste have been followed in other cases. See Minnapolis Sav. & Loan
Ass'n v. Yolton, 193 Min. 632, 2S9 N.W. 382 (1935); Larson v. Orfield, 155
Minn. 282, 193 N.W. 453 (1923); Donnelly v. Butts, 137 Minn. 1, 162 N.W.
674 (1917); National Fire Ins. Co. v. Broadbent, 77 Minn. 175, 79 N.W. 676
(1899). Because of the strict standard which must be met to obtain appoint-
ment of a receiver, few mortgagees are able to invoke the protection of this
remedy.
S6. Annot., 91 A.L.R. 1217 (1984); Annot., 4 A.L.R. 1405 (1919); see,
e.g., Title Guarantee & Trust Co. v. Monsen, 11 Cal. 2d 621, 81 P.2d 944
(1938); Hall v. Goldsworthy, 136 Kan. 247, 14 P.2d 659 (1982); Sullivan v.
Rosson, 223 N.Y. 217, 119 N.E. 405 (1918). See also Swan v. Inderlied, 187
N.Y. 372, 80 N.E. 195 (1907), where an assignment was found valid since
rents are separable incident of possession and can be assigned through the
mortgagor retains the right to possession. See also Berick, supra note 83, at
296; Note, 6 BRoomNn L. REv. 25 (1936). Notwithstanding the existence of
a legislative policy favoring the retention of possession by the mortgagor
pending final termination of his rights, a number of states regard contem-
poraneous or included rent assignments as valid and enforceable. See Gerald-
son, Clauses Increasing the Possessory Rights of Mortgagees, 10 Wis. L. REV.
492, 505 (1935), which concludes that no apparent correlation exists between
the validity or invalidity of a mortgage provision assigning rents and profits
and the absence or presence of statutes favoring possession by the mortgagee.
Oklahoma and Washington prohibit an assignment of rents in the mort-
gage or contemporaneous with it, apparently on public policy grounds. See,
e.g., Hart v. Bingman, 171 Oka. 429, 43 P.2d 447 (1935); Western Loan &
Bldg. Co. v. Miuffin, 162 Wash. 83, 297 Pac. 743 (1931). As for iUnnesota,
see note 38 infra.
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possession of the real property without a foreclosure," 87 and since
rents are an important incident of possession, an assignment of
rents accruing while the mortgagor remains in possession which
is contained in the mortgage instrument or made as part of the
mortgage transaction is also prohibited 8 Yet an assignment of
rents made contemporaneously with the mortgage or included in
it for the limited purpose of paying delinquent taxes, insurance
premiums, and necessary repair costs is held valid and enforce-
able 9 Thus notwithstanding the strong policy favoring continued
possession by the mortgagor, the limited assignment has been en-
forced as a valid exercise of the mortgagee's right to preserve his
37. AMiN.. STAT. § 559.17 (1961).
38. E.g., Erickson-Hellekson-Vye Co. v. A. Wells Co., 217 Minn. 361, 15
N.W.2d 162 (1944); Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Canby Inv. Co., 190
Minn. 144, 251 N.W. 129 (1933); Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. West,
178 Minn. 150, 226 N.W. 406 (1929).
In Orr v. Bennett, 185 Minn. 443, 446, 161 N.W. 165 (1917), the court
articulated the rule as follows:
[T]he mortgagor has the right of possession and the right to the rents
and profits of the land incident to possession during the statutory year
allowed for redemption and until the foreclosure is complete; and any
stipulation in the mortgage, or contemporaneous with it, pledging the
rents and profits of the mortgaged land to the payment of the mortgage
debt contravenes the policy of this statute and is void....
In rejecting the contention that rents are a separable incident of possession
and therefore assignable, the court in Gardner v. W. M. Prindle & Co., 185
Mi1nn. 147, 149, 240 N. W. 851, 852 (1982), reasoned that if rents were sever-
able and so freely assignable, mortgagees could often secure for themselves,
without foreclosure, the equivalent of the complete right to possession and so
circumvent the statute. However, in a recent case the FHA had been assigned
a Minnesota mortgage containing an assignment of rents clause when the
mortgagor defaulted. The federal court held that the FHA could enforce the
clause. In answering the claim that the assignment was invalid under IMN.
STAT. § 559.17 (1961), the court said:
We are not confronted with the rights of the original mortgagee under
the assignment, but with the vested rights of an arm of the Govern-
ment. In authorizing the insurance of loans under the circumstances
herein, Congress was exercising a constitutional function, and the rights
of the United States thereunder must necessarily be decided by Federal
law ....
United States v. Academy Apartments, Inc., 230 F. Supp. 110, 113 (D. Mimn.
1963). The case seems to hold that the FHA can, for overriding federal in-
terests, enforce an assignment of rents clause contained in any mortgage as-
signed to it though the mortgage is on Minnesota property.
39. Erickson-Hellekson-Vye Co. v. A. Wells Co., supra note 38; Mutual
Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Canby Inv. Co., supra note 38; Peterson v. Metropoli-
tan Life Ins. Co., 189 Minn. 98, 248 N.W. 667 (1933); Nielsen v. Heald, 151
Minn. 181, 186 N.W. 299 (1922); Cullen v. Minnesota Loan & Trust Co., 60
Minn. 6, 61 N.W. 818 (1895).
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security which encroaches only minimally upon the possessory
rights of the mortgagor, though in either case the mortgagee is
clearly recovering an incident of possession without foreclosure. 0
The court has also created another exception to the rule against
assignment of rents: an assignment made subsequent to the exe-
cution of the mortgage may pledge rents for application to the
mortgage debt as well as to taxes, insurance, and repairs." In
fact the mortgagor in such instances may validly authorize the
mortgagee to take possession of the premises to facilitate his col-
lection of the rents.4 2 Finally, it seems unlikely that an executed
assignment would be considered invalid; i.e., a mortgagee who
actually receives rents pursuant to an assignment clause in the
mortgage will probably be allowed to apply them to the mortgage
debt.
43
40. In comparing the limited assignment with an assignment to be applied
to the debt, the court in Cullen v. Minnesota Loan & Trust Co., supra, said
that the limited assignment was not "oppressive" to the debtor, the same
"technical objections" did not apply to it, and there are "strong equities" in
favor of its enforcement. Id. at 7, 61 N.W. at 820. Yet, applying the rents to
the debt would not seem to be any more oppressive to the debtor than apply-
ing them to delinquent taxes or insurance premiums. The debtor is responsible
for payment of all three items and the rents would not be applied to the debt
until his default. It is not clear what the Cullen court meant by "technical
objections." However, it is indicated in Cullen that the limited assignment
could be enforced in equity without the taking of possession. The court inti-
mates that to effectuate an unlimited assignment, possession would have to be
taken by the mortgagee and this would be a "process of foreclosure." Ibid.
This distinction is unsound since an unlimited pledge could be enforced
through the use of a receiver, without the mortgagee taking possession. A
more plausible distinction is that the assignment of rents to be applied to the
debt gives the mortgagee additional security whereas the assignment to pre-
vent waste merely preserves the original security. The "strong equities" in favor
of the limited assignment are easily recognized. The mortgagee is a secured
creditor and has a right to preserve his security. The failure of the mortgagor
to pay taxes or insurance payments or to make necessary repairs jeopardizes
that security.
41. Seifert v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 208 Minn. 415, 281 N.W. 770
(1988); Prudential Ins. Co. v. A. Enkema Holding Co., 196 Mlnn. 154, 264
N.W. 576 (1936); Farmers Trust -Co. v. Prudden, 84 Minn. 126, 86 N.W. 887
(1901).
The court's rationale in finding that a subsequent assignment does not
conflict with the statute is that it is the transfer of an interest which the
mortgagor has against the tenants rather than a conveyance of an interest in
real estate. Ibid. The Prudden court's interpretation of the statute as pro-
hibiting only a "conveyance" of an interest in real estate, though plausible,
see note 44 infra, is inconsistent with the construction given the statute in
prohibiting assignments of rents in the mortgage instrument.
42. See cases cited note 41 supra.
48. This distinction would seem to follow from the court's treatment of
the doctrine of "mortgagee in possession." The doctrine has two attributes: (1)
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Aside from whether the legislature ever intended the lien
statute to restrict the free assignability of rents," the current
status of Minnesota law on the subject is not easily justified. No
reason appears for distinguishing between an unlimited assign-
ment in the mortgage, which is invalid, and the same assignment
made subsequent to the mortgage, which is valid.45 To be sure, it
a mortgagee who enters into possession with the consent of the mortgagor
may remain to collect rents and profits until the debt is paid; (2) the mort-
gagee then has a number of duties to the mortgagor including an obligation
to account. The doctrine originated in common-law mortgage law, under
which the mortgagee had title and could enter into possession at any time.
However, some lien states still permit the mortgagee to become a "mortgagee
in possession" by entering peaceably.
Minnesota law provides that a mortgagee may enforce a right to obtain
possession which is granted to him subsequent to the execution of the mort-
gage instrument. See Taylor v. Slingerland, 39 Minn. 470, 40 N.W. 575 (1888),
for a discussion of the early evolution of the doctrine in Minnesota. But
the court has also held that once in possession the mortgagee may remain
even though he was given the right to enter in the mortgage instrument.
Beberman v. Frisch, 242 Minn. 12, 64 N.W.2d 132 (1954); Gandrud v. Hansen,
210 Minn. 125, 297 N.W. 780 (1941); Lemon v. Dworsky, 210 Minn. 112, 297
N.W. 829 (1941); Anderson v. Minnesota Loan & Trust Co., 68 1inn. 491,
71 N.W. 665 (1897). The distinction between mortgagees who have taken
possession and those who have not is based upon a construction of MUm.
STAT. 1 559.17 (1961), which provides that "a mortgage of real property is
not to be deemed a conveyance so as to enable the owner of the mortgage to
recover possession of the real property without a foreclosure." By emphasizing
the word "recover" the court has been able to hold that if the mortgagee pos-
sessed the property at time of suit, it made no difference that his "right" to
take possession was given in the mortgage instrument. Presumably the same
reasoning would give the mortgagee a right to retain rents received prior to
suit no matter where he had been given the "right" to receive the rents.
44. It may plausibly be argued that the sole intent of the legislature was
to repeal the title theory and establish the lien theory without limiting the
incidents and features of the lien. The statute, quoted in text accompanying
note 37 8upra, can be so read by treating the last clause - "so as to enable
the owner of the mortgage to recover possession of the real property without
a foreclosure"- as modifying "conveyance" and not as barring a mortgage
instrument from conferring possessory rights upon the mortgagee without
foreclosure. The reasonableness of this construction is manifested by the
fact that 25 lien states, many of them with statutes similar to Minnesota's,
allow a contemporaneous, unlimited assignment. See, e.g., CAL. Cry. PRoo.
CODE § 744, NEv. REV. STAT. § 40.050 (1957), and UTAH CoDE ANN. § 78-40-8
(1958), which provide that "A mortgage of real property shall not be deemed
a conveyance, whatever its terms, so as to enable the owner of the mortgage
to recover possession of the real property without a foreclosure and sale."
The Florida and Colorado statutes are quite similar to the Minnesota and
California, Nevada, and Utah statutes. COLO. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 118-6-17
(1958); F ,A. STAT. § 697.02 (1961).
45. See note 41 supra. The additional consideration that the mortgagor
may receive for a subsequent assignment furnishes no valid distinction
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may be argued that if mortgagees were allowed to bargain for an
unlimited pledge of rents as an integral part of the original mort-
gage transaction, the parties' unequal bargaining position would
enable the mortgagee to coerce the mortgagor's acceptance of the
provision.46 Yet the likelihood that an assignment subsequent to
the mortgage was obtained by coercion would appear to be sub-
stantially greater. Such an agreement usually is entered into only
by a defaulting mortgagor who, in return for his mortgagee's
promise to delay foreclosure, consents to an unlimited assignment
of rents and profits. 47 Under these circumstances overreaching is
not only possible, but quite probable. Furthermore, insofar as
an opportunistic mortgagor may refuse to make an assignment
subsequent to the creation of the mortgage and instead divert
the rents accruing prior to foreclosure to his personal use, it is
arguable that the Minnesota rule encourages foreclosures and
the mismanagement of mortgaged land. In addition, by requiring
that an unlimited assignment be made subsequent to the creation
of the mortgage in order to be valid, the rule adds a substantial
element of risk and uncertainty to the mortgagee's investment
which will doubtless be reflected in the terms extended to all
mortgagors.
The enforcement of an unlimited assignment of rents and
profits made contemporaneously with or in the mortgage instru-
ment" would not encroach unduly upon the possessory interests
since such consideration could have been required by the mortgage instrument
if an assignment were given when it was executed. In any event, if con-
sideration is significant the validity of an unlimited assignment could be
conditioned on the mortgagee's giving additional consideration for it. As
a practical matter, however, the mortgagor will nearly always receive
additional consideration whether or not it is promised. This is because
mortgagees will almost certainly delay foreclosure as long as substantial
rents are being applied to the debt.
46. The court has never referred to the danger of widespread coercion as
a reason for not enforcing contemporaneous unlimited assignments. It has
relied solely on statutory interpretation.
47. See note 41 supra and accompanying text.
48. Considering the existing case law, it might be to the advantage of
the mortgagee to include the assignment in a separate agreement. Clearly,
an unlimited assignment included in the mortgage instrument would be
terminated at foreclosure since the mortgage is then discharged. See
Gardner v. W. M. Prindle & Co., 185 Minn. 147, 240 N.W. 351 (1932), in
which the mortgagee could not enforce his assignment after foreclosure
though the clause provided for doing so if the mortgagee purchased at the
foreclosure sale. However, in Farmers Trust Co. v. Prudden, 84 Minn. 126,
86 N.W. 887 (1901), where the assignment was executed subsequent to the
mortgage, and thus in a separate instrument, the mortgagee was permitted
to enforce the assignment after the foreclosure sale.
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of the mortgagor, since the rents will be applied to the debt and
an agreement to delay foreclosure may be facilitated. Moreover,
the risk of mismanagement following default poses a particular
threat to the security of a mortgagee of income-producing prop-
erty. Consequently, the added security afforded by a general as-
signment executed contemporaneously with the mortgage instru-
ment should encourage lenders to assume this risk. The vast
majority of mortgagors in default who, to prevent or delay fore-
closure, have given an unlimited pledge subsequent to execution
of the mortgage instrument, would be unaffected by this change.
On the other hand, a contemporaneous assignment would prevent
an opportunistic mortgagor in default from "milking" the property
pending foreclosure, i.e., obtaining rental payments covering
periods of future occupancy or granting rental reductions for such
periods. While it may be argued that mortgage provisions which
entitle mortgagees to valuable possessory rights without fore-
closure contravene the lien theory,49 the presence of the lien label
ought not be controlling . 0 Rather, the validity of these pledges
should be determined and would seem to be well justified by a
practical consideration of the interests of mortgagor and mort-
gagee.51
49. But see note 44 supra.
50. See note 44 supra and accompanying text.
51. Under existing Minnesota law the mortgagee may have difficulty
enforcing an unlimited assignment even if such a clause were permitted. If
a tenant's rental payments were overdue, the mortgagee could obtain them
by an action against the tenant to enforce the assignment. See Mutual
Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Canby Inv. Co., 190 Minn. 144, 251 N.W. 129 (1933)
(unlimited assignment). However, under present Minnesota law it may be
difficult for the mortgagee to assure that rents due in the future will come
into his hands rather than the mortgagor's. Of course if he gained possession
with the consent of the mortgagor he would be a "mortgagee in possession"
and could collect the rents. The only other feasible way to enforce the
assignment would be by obtaining the appointment of a receiver. In Minne-
apolis Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Yolton, 193 Mlnn. 632, 259 N.W. 382 (1935),
the mortgagee sought the appointment of a receiver to enforce a limited
assignment. It can be inferred from the opinion in that case that it is
necessary for a mortgagee seeking the appointment of a receiver to enforce
an assignment to show the existence of the same factors required for appoint-
ment of a receiver in any other case- waste, inadequate security, and in-
solvency of the mortgagor. Thus to give the mortgagee a realistic method of
enforcing his assignment the new legislation should provide for the appoint-
ment of a receiver in instances where it is necessary to enforce the assign-
ment. The Michigan courts have interpreted the remedial statute allowing
an assignment in mortgages on commercial and industrial property, ICm
STAT. AwN. § 26.1137(1) (Supp. 1963), as permitting the mortgagee to obtain
a receiver. Smith v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 362 Mich. 114, 125, 106
N.W.2d 515, 520 (1960).
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CONCLUSION
Some period of redemption after foreclosure sale is desirable
to maximize the mortgagor's ability to recoup his equity in the
property or to arrange for redemption. However, the statutory
period could be substantially shorter than that currently pro-
vided by Minnesota law and yet sufficiently protect the debtor.
The justifications for the shorter period are: the loss created by
defaulting mortgagors who remain in possession after foreclosure
without redeeming is borne by the entire borrowing public; Min-
nesota does not permit acceleration of the entire mortgage debt
upon default; and redeeming mortgagors can generally effectuate
redemption in a shorter time. Also, permitting the mortgagee of
income-producing property to obtain the added security of an
assignment clause in the mortgage seems justified. The excep-
tions to the prohibition illustrate that the policy is not to prevent
the mortgagee from ever reaching the rents, but only to prevent
an assignment at the time of the mortgage. However, considering
the slight detriment to the debtor which arises from an assign-
ment and the need of the mortgagee of income-producing property
for security in addition to the land, this paternalistic policy seems
unjustified.
